恶的问题反而证明上帝存在（普兰丁格）

核心论证 Core Argument

恶的问题通常被用来反对上帝存在，但仔细分析发现恶的存在实际上预设了客观道德标准——而这指向上帝。当无神论者说"真正的恶存在"时，不自觉地借用了有神论资源。在纯粹自然主义中，自然界无善恶之分：狮子吃羚羊不是"恶"，地震不是"恶"——只是自然事件。 格雷格·巴恩森从前设护教学角度深化了这一论证：无神论者使用恶的问题反对上帝时，预设了自己的世界观无法提供的客观道德标准。在无神论框架下，如果按照自然主义假设，人类只是进化过程的偶然产物，"恶"不过是主观的不喜欢。但我们知道大屠杀不仅是"不好的感觉"——它是真正的客观恶。 因此恶的问题非但不是对有神论的反驳，反而成了论证：如果客观恶存在，客观善也存在；如果客观善恶存在，必须有客观道德标准；如果有客观道德标准，必须有道德标准的赐予者——即上帝。 C.S.路易斯描述了自己正是通过恶的问题发现了上帝："我反对上帝的论证恰恰证明了上帝。如果没有善恶之分，又何来不公义呢？"他的经历说明了恶的问题——当你诚实地追问到底——最终指向的不是无神论，而是一位公义和慈爱的上帝。

The problem of evil is typically wielded against God, but careful analysis reveals evil's existence presupposes an objective moral standard — pointing to God. When atheists say 'real evil exists,' they unwittingly borrow theistic resources. In pure naturalism, nature has no moral dimension: lions eating gazelles isn't 'evil,' earthquakes aren't 'evil' — they're natural events. Greg Bahnsen deepened this from a presuppositional perspective: atheists using the problem of evil presuppose something their worldview can't provide — an objective moral standard. Within atheism, if, as naturalism assumes, humans are mere evolutionary accidents, 'evil' is merely subjective dislike. But we know the Holocaust isn't just a 'bad feeling' — it's genuine objective evil. Thus the problem of evil, far from refuting theism, becomes an argument for it: if objective evil exists, objective good exists; if objective good and evil exist, there must be an objective moral standard; if an objective moral standard exists, there must be a Moral Standard-Giver — God. C.S. Lewis described discovering God precisely through the problem of evil: 'My argument against God was itself the strongest argument for God. If there is no good and evil, what does injustice even mean?' His experience shows the problem of evil — honestly pursued to its logical end — points not to atheism but to a just and loving God.