上帝、自由与恶
God, Freedom, and Evil
阿尔文·普兰丁格 / Alvin Plantinga
简介 Summary
普兰丁格对神义论问题的经典解答，被誉为二十世纪分析哲学在基督教神学应用上的杰出范例。面对"全善全能的上帝为何允许恶的存在"这一古老难题，普兰丁格运用可能世界语义学的工具，论证上帝创造包含道德恶的世界与其全善性并不矛盾。这一自由意志辩护论对传统神义论提供了新的哲学基础，影响深远。
Plantinga's classic resolution to the problem of theodicy, hailed as an outstanding example of twentieth-century analytical philosophy applied to Christian theology. Facing the ancient challenge of "why an all-good, all-powerful God permits evil," Plantinga employs tools from possible-world semantics to argue that God's creation of a world containing moral evil does not contradict His perfect goodness. This free will defense provides new philosophical foundations for traditional theodicy, with far-reaching influence.
📑 章节 Chapters
Ch.1: The Challenge of the Problem of Evil
普兰丁格开篇阐述恶的问题对有神论的挑战：如果上帝是全善、全知、全能的，为什么世界上存在恶？这个古老的哲学难题被认为是对上帝存在最强有力的反驳。
Plantinga begins by articulating the problem of evil's challenge to theism: if God is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, why does evil exist in the world? This ancient philosophical puzzle is considered the strongest refutation of God's existence.
“恶的问题被哲学家称为"有神论的阿喀琉斯之踵"——似乎是一个致命的弱点。/ The problem of evil is called by philosophers "theism's Achilles' heel"—seemingly a fatal weakness.”
“如果上帝真的全能，他就能阻止恶的发生；如果他真的全善，他就会想要阻止恶。那么恶为什么存在？/ If God is truly omnipotent, he can prevent evil; if he is truly omnibenevolent, he would want to prevent evil. Then why does evil exist?”
Ch.2: The Logical Form of the Problem of Evil
普兰丁格将恶的问题表述为正式的逻辑论证。批评者声称，上帝的全善全能与恶的存在在逻辑上是不相容的。如果这种不相容性成立，有神论就在逻辑上是不可能的。
Plantinga formulates the problem of evil as formal logical argument. Critics claim God's omnibenevolence and omnipotence are logically incompatible with evil's existence. If this incompatibility holds, theism is logically impossible.
“逻辑的恶的问题声称发现了有神论信念集合中的逻辑矛盾。/ The logical problem of evil claims to discover logical contradiction in the theistic belief set.”
“如果批评者是对的，那么相信上帝就像相信方形的圆一样是不理性的。/ If critics are right, believing in God would be as irrational as believing in square circles.”
Ch.3: The Core of Free Will Defense
普兰丁格提出自由意志辩护：上帝创造了拥有自由意志的被造物，真正的自由意志包含了作恶的可能性。一个没有恶的可能性的世界可能是逻辑上不可能的。
Plantinga proposes the free will defense: God created creatures with free will, and genuine free will includes the possibility of evil. A world without the possibility of evil may be logically impossible.
“真正的自由意志需要真正的选择，而真正的选择必须包括善恶两种可能。/ Genuine free will requires real choices, and real choices must include possibilities of both good and evil.”
“上帝可能无法创造一个既包含自由意志又排除恶的可能性的世界。/ God may be unable to create a world containing both free will and excluding evil's possibility.”
Ch.4: Possible Worlds and the Leibnizian Lapse
运用可能世界语义学，普兰丁格分析了"最好的可能世界"概念。他批评莱布尼茨的观点——认为上帝必须创造最好的可能世界，指出可能没有"最好"的可能世界存在。
Using possible world semantics, Plantinga analyzes the concept of "best possible world." He criticizes Leibniz's view that God must create the best possible world, noting there may be no "best" possible world.
“可能存在一个无限序列的世界，每个都比前一个更好，但没有一个是"最好的"。/ There may be an infinite sequence of worlds, each better than the previous, but none being "the best."”
“如果没有最好的可能世界，那么上帝创造任何世界都不能被指责为不完美。/ If there's no best possible world, then God's creating any world cannot be faulted as imperfect.”
Ch.5: Transworld Depravity
普兰丁格提出"跨世界的不当性"概念：一个自由的被造物可能在每一个可能世界中都会在某些情况下作出错误选择。这意味着即使是全能的上帝也无法保证自由被造物总是选择善。
Plantinga introduces "transworld depravity": a free creature might make wrong choices in some circumstances in every possible world. This means even omnipotent God cannot guarantee free creatures always choose good.
“跨世界的不当性意味着，对于任何可能的自由被造物，都存在一些情况下他会选择作恶。/ Transworld depravity means for any possible free creature, there are circumstances where they would choose evil.”
“上帝的全能不包括做逻辑上不可能的事——比如让自由的被造物总是被迫选择善。/ God's omnipotence doesn't include doing logically impossible things—like making free creatures always be forced to choose good.”
Ch.6: The Problem of Natural Evil
除了道德恶（人的错误选择），自然灾害、疾病、死亡等"自然恶"如何解释？普兰丁格建议这些可能由其他自由存在（如堕落天使）的选择造成，或者是自由意志的间接后果。
Besides moral evil (human wrong choices), how do "natural evils" like disasters, disease, death get explained? Plantinga suggests these may result from other free beings' (like fallen angels) choices or be indirect consequences of free will.
“自然恶可能并非真正"自然"——它们可能由我们无法观察到的自由存在的选择造成。/ Natural evils may not be truly "natural"—they may result from choices by free beings we cannot observe.”
“一个包含真正自由的世界必然包含各种形式的风险和脆弱性。/ A world containing genuine freedom necessarily includes various forms of risk and vulnerability.”
Ch.7: Greater Good Defense
某些恶可能是实现更大善的必要条件。勇气需要危险，怜悯需要痛苦，成长需要挑战。普兰丁格探讨了这种"灵魂建造"的观点的合理性。
Some evils may be necessary conditions for achieving greater goods. Courage requires danger, compassion requires suffering, growth requires challenges. Plantinga explores the reasonableness of this "soul-making" view.
“如果没有真正的苦难，就不可能有真正的同情；如果没有真正的危险，就不可能有真正的勇气。/ Without real suffering, there could be no real compassion; without real danger, there could be no real courage.”
“某些品德和价值可能只能在包含困难和挑战的世界中发展。/ Certain virtues and values may only develop in worlds containing difficulties and challenges.”
Ch.8: The Inductive Problem of Evil
即使逻辑问题被解决，恶的存在仍然可能降低上帝存在的概率。普兰丁格分析这种"归纳"或"证据"的恶的问题，探讨恶是否真的构成反对有神论的证据。
Even if the logical problem is solved, evil's existence might still lower God's existence probability. Plantinga analyzes this "inductive" or "evidential" problem of evil, exploring whether evil truly constitutes evidence against theism.
“恶的数量和强度是否真的是我们在有神论世界中所期望的？这是一个复杂的概率判断问题。/ Are evil's quantity and intensity really what we'd expect in a theistic world? This is a complex probability judgment question.”
“证据的解释总是相对于背景信念和理论框架——恶对不同的人可能意味着不同的事。/ Evidence interpretation is always relative to background beliefs and theoretical frameworks—evil may mean different things to different people.”
Ch.9: Mystery and Silence
普兰丁格承认，即使自由意志辩护成功，我们仍然无法完全理解为什么上帝允许特定的恶事发生。某种程度的神秘和对终极答案的无知是人类条件的一部分。
Plantinga acknowledges that even if free will defense succeeds, we still cannot fully understand why God permits specific evils. Some degree of mystery and ignorance about ultimate answers is part of the human condition.
“我们的认知能力是有限的，不能期望完全理解无限上帝的所有作为和允许。/ Our cognitive abilities are limited; we cannot expect to fully understand all actions and permissions of infinite God.”
“智慧的信仰包括承认我们理解的界限，而不是要求对所有问题都有完整的答案。/ Wise faith includes acknowledging our understanding's limits rather than demanding complete answers to all questions.”
Ch.10: Evil and Religious Life
恶的问题不仅是理论问题，也是实存问题。普兰丁格讨论了受苦对宗教信仰的挑战和深化作用，以及宗教传统如何帮助人们面对恶的现实。
The problem of evil is not only theoretical but existential. Plantinga discusses suffering's challenging and deepening effects on religious faith, and how religious traditions help people face evil's reality.
“面对恶的存在，信仰不是理论上的赞同，而是生活中的委身和信靠。/ Facing evil's existence, faith is not theoretical assent but life commitment and trust.”
“许多最深刻的宗教洞察来自于在苦难中持续的信靠经历。/ Many of the deepest religious insights come from experiences of sustained trust amid suffering.”
Ch.11: Christianity's Particular Response
基督教对恶的问题有其独特的回应：道成肉身的上帝亲自进入苦难，在十字架上承担恶的后果。这不是对恶的完全解释，但提供了独特的盼望和意义。
Christianity has its unique response to evil's problem: the incarnate God personally enters suffering, bearing evil's consequences on the cross. This isn't complete explanation of evil but provides unique hope and meaning.
“基督教不是提供恶的问题的抽象答案，而是宣告上帝与受苦者同在。/ Christianity doesn't provide abstract answers to evil's problem but proclaims God's presence with sufferers.”
“十字架显示，上帝不是远距离地允许苦难，而是亲自承担苦难的重量。/ The cross shows God doesn't permit suffering from a distance but personally bears suffering's weight.”
Ch.12: Evil's Defeat and Ultimate Hope
普兰丁格总结他的论证：自由意志辩护显示了有神论与恶的存在是相容的。更进一步，有神论提供了恶最终被败坏和善最终得胜的盼望，这是纯粹自然主义无法提供的。
Plantinga summarizes his argument: free will defense shows theism is compatible with evil's existence. Furthermore, theism provides hope for evil's ultimate defeat and good's final victory, which pure naturalism cannot offer.
“自由意志辩护的目标不是解释为什么恶存在，而是显示恶的存在与上帝的存在并不矛盾。/ Free will defense's goal is not explaining why evil exists but showing evil's existence doesn't contradict God's existence.”
“在有神论的视野中，恶不是最后的话——善的最终胜利是有保证的。/ In theistic vision, evil isn't the last word—good's ultimate victory is assured.”
“恶的问题虽然严峻，但它不能推翻对慈爱上帝的合理信仰。/ Though the problem of evil is serious, it cannot overthrow reasonable faith in a loving God.”