自我与无我：人的真实身份

核心论证 Core Argument

佛教的"空性"（sunyata）教义——一切事物都没有独立自存的本质——如果贯彻到底，会导致彻底的认识论危机。如果一切都是"空"的，那么"空性"这个教义本身是否也是空的？如果是，我们为什么要接受它？如果不是，那就至少有一件事不是空的，这就否定了普遍空性。 中观学派的龙树试图通过"二谛"理论来回应：世俗谛和胜义谛。但这个回应引发了更多问题：如果世俗层面的所有区分（包括真理与谬误的区分）在胜义层面都不成立，那么佛教教义本身的真理性也在胜义层面不成立。这似乎是一个自我拆台的立场。 基督教提供了截然不同的本体论：万物不是"空"的，而是被一位真实的、有位格的上帝所创造和维持的。万物有真实的存在——不是终极的自存性，而是依赖于创造者的真实存在。这为科学探究提供了基础（物质世界是真实的），为人际关系提供了意义（人是真实的），也为道德提供了根基（善恶是真实的区分）。 此外，空性教义在实践层面难以贯彻。如果你的孩子只是"五蕴的暂时聚合"，没有真实的自我，那父母之爱的基础是什么？基督教肯定爱是终极实在——因为上帝就是爱（约翰一书4:8），而人的受造就是为了爱和被爱。

Buddhism's 'emptiness' (sunyata) doctrine — that nothing has independent self-existence — leads, if taken to its logical conclusion, to a total epistemological crisis. If everything is 'empty,' is the emptiness doctrine itself empty? If so, why accept it? If not, then at least one thing isn't empty, negating universal emptiness. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka school attempted the 'two truths' response: conventional and ultimate truth. But this raises more problems: if all conventional distinctions (including between truth and falsehood) don't hold at the ultimate level, then Buddhism's own truth claims also don't hold ultimately. This appears self-undermining. Christianity offers a radically different ontology: things are not 'empty' but created and sustained by a real, personal God. Things have genuine existence — not ultimate self-existence, but real existence dependent on the Creator. This grounds scientific inquiry (the material world is real), gives relationships meaning (persons are real), and provides a moral foundation (good and evil are real distinctions). Moreover, emptiness is practically unsustainable. If your child is merely a 'temporary aggregation of five skandhas' with no real self, what grounds parental love? Christianity affirms love as ultimate reality — because God IS love (1 John 4:8), and humans were created to love and be loved.