充足理由原则
The Principle of Sufficient Reason
亚历山大·普鲁斯 / Alexander Pruss
简介 Summary
哲学家亚历山大·普鲁斯对充足理由原则的系统研究。充足理由原则是莱布尼茨理性主义哲学的核心概念，该原则主张一切存在和发生都必须有其充足的理由。普鲁斯详细分析了这一原则在形而上学、认识论和神学中的应用，探讨其对上帝存在论证的意义，以及在现代哲学语境下的相关性和挑战。
Philosopher Alexander Pruss's systematic study of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle, central to Leibnizian rationalist philosophy, holds that everything that exists or occurs must have a sufficient reason for its existence or occurrence. Pruss analyzes the application of this principle in metaphysics, epistemology, and theology, exploring its significance for arguments for God's existence and its relevance and challenges in the contemporary philosophical context.
📑 章节 Chapters
Ch.1: Basic Formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
普鲁斯开篇介绍充足理由原则的经典表述："没有任何事物是无理由存在的。"这一原则要求，一切存在的事物、发生的事件、成立的真理，都必须有其充足的理由来解释为什么它是这样而不是那样。
Pruss introduces the classic formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: "Nothing exists without sufficient reason." This principle requires that everything that exists, every event that occurs, every truth that holds, must have sufficient reason explaining why it is so rather than otherwise.
“充足理由原则不仅是逻辑的要求，更是理性思维的基本前提。/ The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not only a logical requirement but a basic premise of rational thinking.”
“如果没有充足理由原则，我们就无法区分必然与偶然，秩序与混沌。/ Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason, we cannot distinguish between necessity and contingency, order and chaos.”
Ch.2: Leibniz's Foundational Contribution
莱布尼茨将充足理由原则提升为形而上学的基本公理，与矛盾律并列。在莱布尼茨的体系中，这一原则不仅解释现实世界的必然性，也为可能世界的概念奠定了基础。
Leibniz elevated the Principle of Sufficient Reason to a basic metaphysical axiom, alongside the law of non-contradiction. In Leibniz's system, this principle not only explains the actual world's necessity but also lays foundations for the concept of possible worlds.
“莱布尼茨的天才在于认识到，充足理由原则是我们理解世界理性结构的钥匙。/ Leibniz's genius lay in recognizing that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the key to understanding the world's rational structure.”
“最好的可能世界不是最完美的世界，而是具有最充足理由存在的世界。/ The best possible world is not the most perfect world but the one with the most sufficient reason to exist.”
Ch.3: Philosophical Challenges to the Principle
普鲁斯考察了历史上对充足理由原则的主要批评：休谟的怀疑论、康德的限制理性论、以及现代科学中的概率论和量子不确定性。每种批评都对原则的普遍适用性提出质疑。
Pruss examines major historical criticisms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Hume's skepticism, Kant's limiting of reason, and modern scientific probability theory and quantum uncertainty. Each criticism questions the principle's universal applicability.
“对充足理由原则的攻击往往源于对理性能力的过度悲观。/ Attacks on the Principle of Sufficient Reason often stem from excessive pessimism about reason's capabilities.”
“概率不是理由的缺失，而是我们对理由认识的限制。/ Probability is not the absence of reason but the limitation of our knowledge of reasons.”
Ch.4: Strong and Weak Versions
普鲁斯区分了充足理由原则的不同版本：强版本要求一切偶然事实都有决定性理由，弱版本只要求解释性理由的存在。这种区分有助于应对各种哲学挑战。
Pruss distinguishes different versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: strong versions require deterministic reasons for all contingent facts, weak versions only require explanatory reasons' existence. This distinction helps address various philosophical challenges.
“原则的力量不在于其最强版本，而在于其核心洞察的不可否认性。/ The principle's power lies not in its strongest version but in the undeniability of its core insight.”
“理由的充足性是相对于解释目标而言的，不是绝对的。/ The sufficiency of reason is relative to explanatory goals, not absolute.”
Ch.5: Causal Chains and Infinite Regress
充足理由原则引发的一个经典问题是无限回归：如果每个事物都需要理由，那么理由的理由又需要什么理由？普鲁斯探讨了终止无限回归的可能方案。
A classic problem raised by the Principle of Sufficient Reason is infinite regress: if everything needs a reason, what reason does the reason's reason need? Pruss explores possible solutions for terminating infinite regress.
“无限回归的威胁并不能否定充足理由原则，而是要求我们寻找最终的解释基础。/ The threat of infinite regress does not negate the Principle of Sufficient Reason but requires us to seek ultimate explanatory foundations.”
“必然存在的事物是自我解释的，因此能够终止解释链条。/ Necessarily existing beings are self-explaining and thus can terminate explanatory chains.”
Ch.6: Applications in Modal Logic
现代模态逻辑为充足理由原则提供了新的表达工具。普鲁斯运用可能世界语义学，重新阐释了原则在必然性和偶然性关系中的作用。
Modern modal logic provides new expressive tools for the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Pruss uses possible-world semantics to reinterpret the principle's role in relationships between necessity and contingency.
“模态逻辑不是抛弃充足理由原则的工具，而是精确表达它的语言。/ Modal logic is not a tool for abandoning the Principle of Sufficient Reason but a language for expressing it precisely.”
“在可能世界的框架中，充足理由原则获得了新的生命力。/ Within the possible-worlds framework, the Principle of Sufficient Reason gains new vitality.”
Ch.7: Reconstructing the Cosmological Argument
普鲁斯展示了如何运用充足理由原则来重建宇宙论论证。这个论证不依赖于时间上的第一因，而是基于存在链条的形而上学依赖关系。
Pruss demonstrates how to use the Principle of Sufficient Reason to reconstruct the cosmological argument. This argument relies not on a temporal first cause but on metaphysical dependency relationships in chains of existence.
“现代宇宙论论证的力量不在于证明时间的开始，而在于揭示存在的依赖性。/ The power of modern cosmological arguments lies not in proving time's beginning but in revealing existence's dependency.”
“偶然存在者的集合不能解释自己的存在，因此需要外在的必然解释者。/ Collections of contingent beings cannot explain their own existence and thus require external necessary explainers.”
Ch.8: Reason in Scientific Explanation
普鲁斯分析科学解释与充足理由原则的关系。科学定律本身就是寻求现象背后理由的努力，而定律的存在和特定形式同样需要形而上学的解释。
Pruss analyzes the relationship between scientific explanation and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Scientific laws themselves are efforts to seek reasons behind phenomena, while laws' existence and specific forms also require metaphysical explanation.
“科学的成功证明了充足理由原则的有效性，而不是相反。/ Science's success proves the Principle of Sufficient Reason's validity, not the opposite.”
“自然定律不是对充足理由原则的替代，而是它在经验领域的体现。/ Natural laws are not replacements for the Principle of Sufficient Reason but its manifestation in the empirical realm.”
Ch.9: Moral Truth and Reason
充足理由原则在道德哲学中的应用引发深刻问题：道德真理是否需要形而上学基础？普鲁斯论证，客观道德真理的存在需要某种超越人类约定的理由基础。
The Principle of Sufficient Reason's application in moral philosophy raises profound questions: do moral truths require metaphysical foundations? Pruss argues that objective moral truths' existence requires some reason-foundation beyond human conventions.
“如果道德真理是客观的，它们就需要像其他真理一样具有充足的存在理由。/ If moral truths are objective, they need sufficient reason for existence like other truths.”
“道德义务的约束力来自于理由的强制性，而非任意的决定。/ Moral obligations' binding force comes from reason's compulsion, not arbitrary decisions.”
Ch.10: The Metaphysical Significance of the Principle
普鲁斯总结充足理由原则的深层形而上学意义：它不仅是认识论的工具，更是实在本身的基本特征。实在的理性结构使得知识和真理成为可能。
Pruss summarizes the Principle of Sufficient Reason's deep metaphysical significance: it is not only an epistemological tool but a basic feature of reality itself. Reality's rational structure makes knowledge and truth possible.
“充足理由原则不是我们强加给世界的要求，而是我们在世界中发现的结构。/ The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a requirement we impose on the world but a structure we discover in the world.”
“理性不是人类的发明，而是实在本身的特征，我们只是它的发现者和参与者。/ Reason is not a human invention but a feature of reality itself; we are merely its discoverers and participants.”